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Abstract 
Since the passage of Public Law 94-265 - the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976_- there has been 
increased awareness among the public and among academicians 
in the problems of common property resources. The literature 
reviewed and summarized here deals with a number of the major 
issues related to common property resource management, and 
with the particular management technique most often mentioned 
for fisheries: limited entry. As with any review of the 
literature, it is not inclusive; rather it attempts to cover 
the literature that is frequently referenced and/or basic to 
an understanding of common property resource management. 
PREFACE 
This research was prepared with funds from the National Marine 
Fisheries Service under Contract #03-78-DOl-72, and additional sup-
port from the Pew Memorial Trust and by the Department of Commerce, 
NOAA Office of Sea Grant under Grant #04-8-MOl-149, and the Insti-
tution's Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program. This report 
is a partial fulfillment of the Negotiated Research Contract for 
the National Marine Fisheries Service. The author wishes to ack-
nowledge Drs. Robert Edwards, Susan Peterson and Leah Smith for offering 
me the opportunity, criticism and support; Drs. Richard Hennemuth, Keith 
Smith and James Kirkley for their constructive criticism; Mrs. Ann 
Martin for all her help in preparing this manuscript; and Miss Kaleroy 
Hatzikon, Lynda Davis, Jane Zentz and Catherine Ferreira for typing the 
report. Acknowledgment is also extended to Librarians Judy Brownlow 
and Karin Negoro and other enumerators who kindly provided the informa-
tion for me. 
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Acheson, J. M. l975. Fisheries Management and Social Context: The 
Case of the Maine Lobster Fishery. Tran~ Am. Fish. Soc . 104(4): 
653:668. 
The author discusses the importance of social context to fisheries 
management . Fisheries management agencies have traditionally promoted 
regulations with only the resource in mind. All too often, the regula-
tions proposed have conflicted so strongly with basic social and cultural 
features of fishing communities that they have been massively resisted. 
Here it is argued that opposition to fisheries regulations would be 
minimized if such regulations were congruent with the existing social 
and economic system . Five kinds of management proposals designed to de-
crease fishing effort in the Maine lobster industry are discussed agains t 
the background of certain key institutional features of coastal communit ies. 
Survey results suggest that any attempt to decrease fishing effort by a 
moratorium on fishing, by taxation, or by the imposition of many biological 
controls (e.g., raising the legal carapace size) would be resisted strongly. 
On the other hand, a trap limit and limited entry scheme are consistent 
enough with some institutional features - especially the system of fishing 
territories - that they would receive substantial political support. How-
ever, the lobster industry in Maine is so heterogeneous that no manageria l 
proposal would be supported universally. 
Adasiak, A. 1978. Experience with 
at the National Conference to 
Fisheries Management, Denver, 
Limited Entry: Alaska, 
Consider Limited Entry 
Colorado, July 17-19. 
Paper presented 
as a Tool in 
This paper reviews the goals and performance of the limited entry program 
in Alaska beginning in 1973 and discusses the present problems and future 
prospects. At present 29 fisheries are under entry limitation in Alaska. 
Goals, exrlicitly or implicitly, include the intention of shifting power from 
processors to fishermen, minimum social dislocation based on percent of income 
earned from the fishery and permit transferability, a professionalized and 
diversified fleet, economic health and stability, conservation and sustained 
yield management and buyback. 
Some apparent results are that financial opportunity and the bargaining 
strength of fishermen has increased; social, nonpecuniary handling of permits 
is operative; the price of entry permits has increased rapidly, and an ex-
clusive "rich men's club" has been created. Major problems pertain to lack 
of information, complexity, the problem of part-timers vs. full-timers, legal 
constraints , allocation criteria litigation, the litigation workload, entry 
permit prices, community disruption, program monitoring, and effects on non-
limited fisheries. Juding by Alaska's experience, the political reality for 
establishing a limited entry system depends on the impetus of a crisis or a 
disaster. 
2 
Agnello, R. J. and L. P. Donnelley 1975. Property Rights and Efficiency 
in the Oyster Industry. ~· J.Jaw Econ. 18(2) :521-533. 
The significance of pr~perty rights for one aspect of economic 
effie iency, labor productivity, is empirically tested, using data from 
the U.S. East and Gulf coast oyster industry. 
The findings suggests that private property rights in general make 
a significant difference in a state's average labor productivity in oyster 
harvesting. Common property rights are associated with low labor productivity 
resulting from disinvestment, congestion, over-exploitation and government 
restrictions. Since the costs of enforcing private rights do not seem to 
be a serious problem for sessile species in intertidal coastal waters, 
considerations other than efficiency are used by states relying upon common 
property for the oyster industry. 
Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 1974. Proposed Regulations 
Limited Entry. Report to the Fishermen of Alaska, July 1; State of 
Alaska, Juneau. 
These proposed regulations for issuing permanent entry permits into 
some Alaskan fisheries were prepared by the Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission, the State of Alaska, and addressed to the fishermen of Alaska. 
Fisheries proposed for limited entry in 1975 were all salmon seine and 
gill net fisheries in Alaska, except those in the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim 
area. An entry limit on the power troll fishery was also proposed. 
The commission made these proposals after sponsoring more than thirty 
public meetings during the previous year to discuss limited entry and get 
fishermen's views on how best to apply it to different fisheries. The Com-
mission planned to adopt final regulations after reviewing public testimony 
and making adjustments and revisions. 
... 
Alaska Governor's Study Group on Limited Entry 1973. 
Program for Alaska's Fisheries, State of Alaska, 
3 
A Limited Entry 
Juneau. 345 pp. 
This study was the first large-scale effort by the State of Alaska to 
gather information on Alaska's commercial fishermen and on the commercial 
salmon fishery as it relates to them. This summary is to provide a factual basis 
for developing a program for limiting entry into Alaska's fisheries and applying 
that program to the overcrowded salmon fishery. 
These are some highlights of Governor William A. Egan's plan for limiting 
entry. The plan is intended to make the fishery accessible to those who depend 
most on fishing. This l imited entry program is for commercial fishing only, 
and does not affect sport fishing or subsistence fishing . . It is to operate 
independently of the existing licensing system. Initially, the program is 
directed at the types of gear used to take salmon co~nercially; however , it 
is also designed to apply to any species for which fishing pressure is too 
great. The plan calls for the establishment of a full-time three-man Alaska 
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission composed of a commercial fisherman, a 
fisheries management specialist and an attorney. Commissioners would be given 
broad powers to limit entry to the fisheries. This study attempts to provide 
a sound starting point for a legal and workable limited entry program for 
Alaska's fisheries. Questions and answers on limited entry are included. 
Allen, W.R. Scarcity and Order: The Hobbesian Problem and the hlumean Resolution. 
Soc. Sci. Quart. 57(2):263-275 . 
Our present world of scarcity without the resources adequate to provide all of 
our wants and needs is a world of limitations, constraints, and conflicts, requir-
ing the bearing of costs and calling for communal coordination. Such conse-
quences of scarcity have profound repercussions on and implications for the 
broadest and most elemental considerations of societal arrangements. Hobbes was 
the first writer to comprehend and explain the problem of order when men-selfish, 
passionate, fearful, aggressive, and yet rational-seek to satisfy their individual 
and diverse desire with scarce resources. But Hobbes's solution-introduction 
through a social contract of an absolute sovereign "To keep them in awe, and 
to direct their actions to the Common Benefit"-has been philosophically unsat-
isfying and logically-empirically dubious. However, to the economist the Hobbesian 
problem of order is not only real, but central. 
Hume sought to reconcile private and public economic interest with societal 
arrangements, encompassing a competitive market mechanism, which tend to guide 
selfishly generated energies into coordinated ways beneficial to the community. 
Hume indicated that men act in partial awareness of personal advantage, but with 
individual time horizons too brief and interests too particular to ensure social 
efficiency and stability. The social order must be placed on firmer ground than 
a sense of sacrificial moral obligation to the collectivity or a mythical con-
tractual requirement. Rather, what is required is that members of the group find 
constitutional constraints, societal conventions, and institutional options to 
provide approximation of optimal possibilities for individual gain and benefit-
but with "the avidity and partiality of men .. restrained by some general and 
inflexible principles." But "rules without a supportive ethic" may be fragile. 
In stipula t ing and enforcing minimal "rules of the game," if in nothing else, a 
society and its economy require some coercion: a "free" society cannot be in a 
situation of anarchy. 
4 
Anderson, L. G. 1975. Optimum Economic Yield of An Internationally 
Utilized Common Property Resource. U. S. Fish. Bull. 73(1): 51-66. 
A simple general equilibrium model is used to analyze the problem 
of the allocation of fisheries resources where common property or 
open access occur. The model was applied to three cases of one country, 
two countries and international models. It is possible to explicitly 
take into account the lost production of other goods. Improvements 
in terms of trade for either the exporter or the importer of fish can 
in some circumstances lead to a decrease in welfare; and attempts at 
unilateral management can lead to a decrease in welfare, depending on 
the way in which the other country's fishing industry reacts. The 
author presents three conditions for maximum economic yield (MEY) of 
an internationally utilized fishery under free market conditions, open 
access and open~access with free trade. Assuming the willingness of 
government to negotiate in an open and far ranging manner at zero cost; 
free trade in all goods; regulation methods that are not at the expense 
of efficiency, and a physically independent fish stock that is available 
only to two countries, the discussion showed that the international MEY 
of the fishery can be reached. 
Anderson, L. G. 1976. The Relationship Between Firm and Fishery in 
Common Property Fisheries. Land Econ. 52(2): 179-191. 
The author shows the relationship between firm and industry in 
a common property fishery and compares and contrasts it to the 
standard analysis. Fishing effort is considered as the output of 
the vessels. Formulated in this way, the model provides for a more 
explicit and hence empirically meaningful model than does the 
standard analysis based on catch rate. Use of the model can provide 
insight that is necessary for the proper regulation of a fishery 
composed of independent vessels. 
5 
Anderson, L. G. editor 1977. Economic Impacts of Extended Fisheries Juris-
diction. Ann Arbor Science Publishers, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
428 pp. 
This volume contains all the papers presented at the conference on Economic 
Impacts of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction held at the University of Delaware in 
April 1976. The book is divided into six sections: 1) international aspects of 
extended jurisdiction; 2) optimum economic yield and extended jursidiction; 3) 
industry aspects of extended jurisdiction; 4) practical management problems; 
5) optimal control and fisheries management; and 6) discussion. 
The first section includes: World-wide economic aspects of extended 
fishery jurisdiction management, by Frederick W. Bell; Canada and Fisheries 
Management with Extended Jurisdiction: A Preliminary View, by Gordon R. 
Munro; Conditions for Effective Fisheries Management in the Northwest Atlantic, 
by Giulio Pontecorvo, Douglas M. Johnston and Maurice Wilkinson; Law of the 
Sea Negotiations and Extended Jurisdiction, by James A. Storer; The Management 
of Foreign Fishing with Reference to the New England Herring Stocks, by Lars 
Vidaeus and Virgil J. Norton; and Anadromous Species and Extended Jursidiction, 
by R. Bruce Rettig and Richard S. Johnston. 
The second section contains: Limited Access Systems Under the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, by Francis T. Christy, Jr.; Production 
Relationships Among Interrelated Fisheries, by Richard J. Agnello and Lee G. 
Anderson; Fee Management Systems for the Northwest Atlantic, by James A. Wilson 
and Robert C. Anderson; Some Aspects of Optimal Timing of Intraseasonal Catch, 
by Richard J. Agnello and Lawrence P. Donnelley; and Fishing Boat Income, Capital 
and Labor: A Distributional Study of a New England Port, by Leah J. Smith. 
In the third section: Marketing and Distribution Problems With Extended 
Jurisdiction, by A. Desmond O'Rourke; and Domestic Investment in Harvesting 
and Processing Sectors Required To Utilize Fish Stocks Available Under Extended 
Jurisdiction, by John Vondruska. 
The fourth section: Instituting a Management Regime for the Prawn Fishery 
of the Northern Territory of Australia, by Parzival Copes; From Economic Theory 
to Fisheries Policy: Conceptual Problems and Management Prescriptions, by 
Daniel W. Bromley and Richard C. Bishop; and Incorporating Economic Consider-
ations into Practical Fishery Policies, by C. Bruce Austin. 
The fifth section: Control Theory in Fisheries Economics: Frill or 
Fundamental? by Colin W. Clark; A Management Model for a Multispecies Fishery, 
by I.E. Strand and D. L. Rueth; and Optimal Fishery Management Under Conditions 
of Uncertainity, by Tracy R. Lewis. 
The final section contains two reviews of the conference as a whole, one 
by an economist, James A. Crutchfield, and the other by a biologist, Dayton L. 
Alverson. In addition there are commentaries on several papers. 
6 
Anderson, L.G. 1977. The Economics of Fisheries Management. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 214 pp. 
The rational exploitation of fisheries has many aspects - biological, 
legal, political, and economic - each of which has given rise to voluminous 
literature. However, no clear, concise discussion of the economic aspects 
exists, because the materials are dispersed. This is a first attempt to 
present these materials in a complete and detailed manner, yet one that 
the diligent non-economist can understand. 
This book on the e~onomic theory of fisheries exploitation presents a 
brief introduction to the basic principles of. economics important to the 
study of fisheries, and gives an economic analysis which includes the concept 
of equilibrium in a fishery. More intricate economic models of fisheries 
exploitation are used to consider the effects of more complex population 
dynamics and the concepts of a maximum social yield, of an international 
maximum economic yield, of multi-species and interdependent fisheries, 
and of formal dynamic models. A general discussion of types of fishery 
regulation focuses primarily on their economic aspects. Some recent 
empirical studies are introduced, and the author shows how the theory of 
the previous chapters can be used to provide useful information. 
Anderson, T. L. and P. J . Hill 1975. 
Rights: A Study of the American 
163-179. 
7 
The Evolution of Property 
West. J. Law Econ. 18(1): 
The effects of property rights and the r..vay they are ass.igned, 
enforced, and transferred, on the allocation of resources and hence 
the amount and distribution of output are examined. Assuming that 
the social arrangements, laws, and customs which govern asset owner-
ship are established on the basis of variables endogenous to the economic 
system, such as demand, factor endowments and technology, the authors 
develop a theory of property rights evolution. On the benefit side 
of an individual's investment decision, the value of the asset and 
the probability of losing the right to use that asset rises with the 
degree of definition and enforcement activity. On the cost side are 
the production function for such activities and the opportunity costs 
of resources devoted to definition and enforcement. Technological 
change on lower resource prices i ncreases property rights activity. 
Empirical results suggest that data from the history of the 
American West is consistent with the theory: when the benefits 
increased or cost decreased, individuals increased the amount of 
time and resources they devoted to definition and enforcement of 
r~ghts to land, water, and livestock. When declining livestock and 
land values decreased the marginal gain, there was a reduction in 
enforcement activity. 
Anderson, T. L. and P. J. Hill 1976. The Role of Private Property in 
the History of American Agriculture, 1776-1976. Am. _.1...: Agr. 
Econ. 58(5):937-945. 
The evolution process has tempered the structure of property 
rights in the agricultural sector; the authors discuss how these 
rules have affected resource allocation. Six periods in American 
agricultural history are examined: the adjustment of new conditions 
in colonial America, the formation of a national land policy, west-
ward expansion, the closing of the frontier, the new role of govern-
ment, and the recent environmental movement. 
Early in the history of this nation a firm basis was l a id for an 
efficient allocative mechanism in agriculture-a property system that 
provided strong incentives for increases in production. Between colonial 
time s and the first three quarters of the nineteenth century the main 
fo cus was on defining and enforcing property rights in inputs which 
was instrumental in directing the course of private property rights, 
especially to land. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
until the present, the primary concern of the farmer has been with the 
establishment of private property rights in a larger share of the 
national income; again these efforts were influential i n setting the 
direction of federal policy. Now with the rise of water and land use 
planning, the agricultural sector is again concerning itself with the 
definition and enforcement of rights in inputs . Concerns for equity 
have increased t~·ansfer activity accompanied by government regulation. 
8 
Anonymous 1973. Alaska's Limited Entry Law, A Summary: What It Means to 
You. Alaska Seas and Coasts 1(3):1-3, 7-8 . 
This summary describes Alaska's limited entry law. In 1972 Alaska's 
voters approved, by a four-to-one margin, a constitutional amendment 
enabling Gov. William A. Egan and the state legislature to enact limited 
entry. The basic objective of the legislature was to develop a program 
that would stop gear expansion; allow for new entry, avoid paralyzing 
the normal, necessary transitions between gear types and between areas; 
pass the tests of the courts, and place as small a hardship as possible 
on all fishermen. Finally, it had to be politically acceptable. 
The bill established an Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
which would regulate entry into all commercial fisheries of the state by 
issuing interim-use permits or entry permits to qualified individuals. 
This describes the limited entry law, focusing on responsibilities 
and duties of the Commission, permits, eligibility of permits, maximum 
number of permits, issuance of permits, terms and conditions, fees for 
permits, transfer of permits, buy-back fund, optimum number of permits, 
some common misconceptions. 
In addition, this newsletter includes "Fishermen's Forum (pages 2-3)" 
which deals with questions and answers on the limited entry law. 
9 
Anonymous 1977. Fisheries Symposium 1977; Symposium on the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Washington Law Review 
52(3) :427-745. 
The articles in the Symposium on the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 held at the University of Washington in 1977, 
are included in this review: The Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, by 
Warren Magnuson; Potential Conflicts Between a Future Law of the Sea 
Treaty and the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, by 
Jon Jacobson and Dougles Cameron; Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot by Eugene Fidell; 
Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications of the New 
Structure, by Giulio Pontecorvo; The Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976: Management Objectives and the Distribution of Benefits and 
Costs, by Francis T. Christy; Recapture of Economic Rent Under the FCMA: 
Sections 303-304 on Permits and Fees, by William T. Burke; Economic Dimensions 
of Fees and Access Control Under the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976, by Robert Anderson and James Wilson; and The Role of 
Conservation and Fishery Science Under the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976, by Dayton L. Alverson. 
Anonymous 1976. Legal dimensions of entry: Fishery Management. William 
and Mary Law Review 17: 757-779. 
The constitutional objections to the exclusionary theory of limited 
entry are reviewed. A limited entry program is subject to at least three 
constitutional challenges. The equal protection clause challenge would 
assert that the method by which access to the fishery is allocated un-
reasonably discriminates between the persons willing to participate. The 
due process claim would allege that liberty (the right to fish) and/or 
property (the fish or fishing gear) were being taken without satisfying 
due process standards. The takings claim is a variant of due process; 
the fisherman would assert that the regulatory scheme resulted in a taking 
of his property for public use without compensation. 
Limited entry may be implemented through the use of licenses, stock 
certificates, or user fees. Two legal considerations underlie implementation 
of each of these alternatives. These are 1) creation of a new form of 
property in the right to fish and the attributes of the property; and 2) 
allocation and distribution of the newly created property. The major problems 
facing limited entry are not legal but rather are practical and political. 
10 
Asada, Y. 1973. License Limitation Regulations: The Japanese System. 
J. Fish. Res. Board Canada 30(12): 2085-2097. 
This paper reviews license limitation regulations in Japan, where the 
major f :lsheri.es are controlled. A fishing license legally exempts an in-
dividual from those prohibitions imposed for conservation purposes or for 
the maintenance of order in the exploitation of fishing grounds. Licenses 
are subject to restrictions in respect to area fished , closed season, vessel 
tonnage, equipment and power, minimum size of fish, and others. 
The number of licenses issued has increased in only a few fisheries. 
In several instances their number has been reduced when exploitation seemed 
too high; in some cases vessels have been transferred to other fisheries; in 
others those phased out have been compensated by those remaining. Since re-
newal is nearly assured, the license acquires value, and is used as security 
for investments and loans, although there is no fee charged for the licenses. 
Although the licensing system in Japan is regarded as successful, some 
improvements are needed. A tonnage supplement system is proposed to reduce 
the effects of increase in fishing power resulting from the use of larger and 
more efficient vessels within the licensing system. 
Ashby, F.R.S. and M. Anderson 1976. Studies in the Politics of Environmental 
Protection: The Historical Roots of the British Clean Air Act, 1956: 1. 
The Awakening of Public Opinion over Industrial Smoke, 1843-1853. ISR 1 
(4): 279-290. 
Air is a 'free good' which nobody owns; therefore it will not be protected 
from pollution by the voluntary efforts of individuals for protection costs 
money. If it is to be protected, intervention has to come from the state, and 
if the state is to intervene, three conditions must be satisfied: 1) the cause 
of the nuisance must be understood scientifically and there must be a practicable 
technology for abating it; 2) it must be politically practicable and advisable 
to bring in laws or regulations to abate it; 3) ther e must be practicable means 
for surveillance over the laws and regulations and recourse to courts in cases 
of infringement. 
This is the first of three articles about the campaign to abate smoke in 
the cities of England. It began early in the 19th century and culminated in 
the Cl ean Air Act,l956. Between 1844 and 1850 no fewer than six bills were 
introduced into parliament to compel furnaces to 'consume their own smoke'. 
All failed although enough was known about the science and technology of com-
bustion to justify legislation for furnaces used to raise steam power. In 
1853 Palmerston succeeded in putting on the statute books the first really 
effective clean air act for the metropolis of London. It did not cover dwelling 
houses; the campaign to bring these under the law had to await improvements in 
the design of domestic grates. It was during the decade 1843-1853 that the 
public conscience was awakened to the need for laws to protect the environment 
against pollution. 
11 
Bell, D. M. 1978. Gear Reduction/Buy-Back Programs in British Columbia 
and Washington State. Paper presented at the Workshop and 
Conference of Limitation of Entry into Fisheries, Institute 
for Marine Studies, University of Washington, May 8. 
The British Columbia experience with a buy-back program and the 
Washington state experience with a gear reduction program are reviewed, 
compared, and evaluated for future prospects. 
The British .Columbia program is an example of a broadly based 
cooperative industry effort and represents only one phase of a 
comprehensive program dealing with a reduction in fishing effort for 
the entire salmon fishery, while the Washington state program provides 
economic assistance for fishermen who were adversely affected by a 
federal court decision (the Boldt Decision of 1974 - Indians are entitled 
to 50% of the salmon harvest ... ) and is much narrower in scope than the 
British Columbia program. 
In addition to Indian/non-Indian conflicts, a substantial number of 
vessels involved in the both programs are moving into the salmon fisheries 
of adjacent political entities. The Washington state department of fisheries 
is developing a data base of socio-economic information for salmon fishing 
in the state of Washington to use as a basis for effective management decisions. 
12 
Bel l , F . W. 1972 . Technological Externalities and Common Property 
Resourc es: An Empi rical Study of the U.S . Northern Lobster 
Fishery. J. Pol. Econ. 80(1): 148-158. 
, 
Quantita t ive ana l ysis is used to demonstrate the ef f ect of tech-
no l ogical ext ernalities on the production of northern lobster, a common-
pr oper t y r esource. The results show that an increase in effort of 
100 ,.000 traps fished will depress landings per trap fished by 2.4 
pounds . Because of this technological externality and the maximum 
s usta i nable yield (MSY) f rom the resource , the cost functions of 
northern l ocation are different from nor~al cost functions. First , 
t he tec hnological externality produces a rising-cost industry through-
out expansion , in contrast to manufacturing industries where .long-run 
av erage cos ts first decline and then increase.. Second, after reaching 
MSY t he average co s t function bends backward, since additional effort 
pr oduces a r educ tion in output at higher unit costs. As shown by 
Gordon (1 954) , the industry will produce so as to equate average revenue 
to l ong-run av er age cost. Approximately one half of the present fish-
ing e ffort would be need ed to achieve economic efficiency or marginal 
cos t pric ing (wher e marginal cost equals to marginal revenue). Unless 
entry t o the common-property resource is controlled, further increases 
in pric e because of rising consumer demand for lobster could potentia ll y 
des troy the resource as more and more capital and labor are .attracted 
to the f ishery. The only solution to the market failure is government 
intervention, which must be qualified to include trade offs between 
op t imum r esource allocation versus employment effects. 
Berry, D. and G. Steiker 1977. An Economic Analysis of Transfer of 
Development Rights. Natural Res. J. 17(1): 55- 80. 
The problems of more urbanization have prompted a number of 
method s to protect valuable landscapes and landmarks and to control 
the s pa t i al patt ern of growth. These include 1) tax incentives, 
2) zoning, 3) publ i c purchase of certain development rights , 4) public 
purchase of the f ee , 5) establishing rural districts, and 6) transfer 
o f d eve l opment rights. 
Thi s articl e uses economic analysis to examine the implications 
of tra n s f erable development rights (TDR) arrangements. Under the TDR 
sc heme, al l l a nd could be equipped with deve lopment rights and then 
zoned for variou s kinds of deve lopment. TDR's would then be awarded 
to al l land owners, but developers would have to purchase the requisite 
number of right s. 
TDR's are r egarded as superior to other methods of protecting 
valua ble landscapes and landmark because they impose relatively little 
cost on the public , they are essentially self-working market operations , 
a nd because they provide some compensation to landowners whose privileges 
of conversion are restricted. 
13 
Bishop, R. C. 1973. Limitation of Entry in the United States Fishing Industry: 
An Economic Appraisal of a Proposed Policy. Land Econ. 49(4): 381-390. 
The author maintains that the potential gains from limiting entry into 
United States fisheries are so small that they could conceivably be more than 
offset by adverse effects on the distribution of income. 
Economic inefficiency arising from misallocation of resources to the 
U. S. fishing industry is unimportant given its small share of total U.S. 
output; therefore, limited entry programs which could possibly correct such 
misallocations ~ould be of limited benefit. Furthermore, given misallocations 
in the rest of the economy, an efficient allocation of resources to the 
fishing industry would be indeterminant. While limitation of entry could 
yield some windfalls to included fishermen in the short run, it would probably 
do little to alleviate poverty in the fisheries. Too little is known about 
the socioeconomic situation in fishing in the United States to predict what 
would happen were limitations of entry imposed. The more immobile excluded 
fishermen are, the greater would be their burden of limitation ,if entry 
is imposed. There are also redistributive implications for consumers of a 
decrease in the supply. 
Bishop, R. C. 1975. Limitation of Entry in the United States Fishing Industry : 
A Reply. Land Econ. 51(2): 182-185. 
This reply to comments by Owers and by Wilson and Olson on Bishop's 
article focuses on the social objectives of fisheries regulation, immobility 
and incomes of fishermen, and theoretical points of difference. 
The most important social problems are the conservation of fisheries 
r esources and the maintenance of a satisfactory distribution of catches, not a 
misallocation of resources between fishing and other industries. The potential 
of limited entry is not a fishery conservation tool, nor a tool to protect target 
groups of fishermen whose economic well-being is threatened by open access. For 
most present cases, the traditional total-catch quota systems are the conceptually 
sound approach to controlling overfishing unless there is concern about inter-
industry misallocation. If the rent from a fishery under limitation of entry is 
allowed to go into the fishermen's pockets, political pressures to enlarge the 
fishery may be increased. Nor has limitation of entry proven itself as a policy 
tool to control who rece~ves the income from fishing. 
Will limited entry reduce poverty in the fisheries? No such generalization 
is warranted. Although a highly mobile group of fishermen exists, a significant 
portion of the fishing labor force and fixed capital in Alaska is immobile. In 
appraising the potential gains in efficiency from limitation of entry , it is 
important to remember that many fisheries are not MSY or overfished biologically . 
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Bishop, R. C., G. V. Johnson , and K. Samples . l978 . Wisconsin's Limited 
Entry Experience. Paper presented at the Workshop on Limitation 
of Entry, University of Washington, May 15-18. 
This summary of ten years of Wisconsin's experiences with limited entry 
maintains that inadequate attention to the linkages between equity and 
efficiency has been given by economists advocating limited entry. 
Although some problems exist, improved fishing, lake trout quotas and 
protection from entry seem to have contr ibuted to an environment of guarded 
optimism in the Lake Superior fisheries. However , this approach is unpopula r 
among the people of Lake Michigan. Part of the explanation must lie in the 
fact that Lake Michigan has not experienced the tensions over scarce lake 
trout resources that deve loped at Lake Superior. Nevertheless, a desire 
t o clarify management authority led to limited entry, and the result was 
Wisconsin's 1978 Fishing Law which greatly expanded the Department of 
Natural Resources authority in fisheries management . Limited entry is 
regard ed a set of tools f or mana gement and not a goal in itself. 
Boeri, D. and J. Gibson 1976. 
England Offshore Fishery. 
Maine, 154 pp. 
Tell it Good-Bye , Kiddo: The Decline of the New 
International Marine Publishing Company, Camd en , 
The decline of New England's offshore groundfishing industry, a fl ee t of 
boats that onc e supplied much of America's demand for fish, is told from the 
level of the commercial fisherman to the dockside sale of fish, then to the 
business of fish companies and corporations, and finally to the workings of 
government agencies , the policies of the federal government toward fishing, a nd 
the actions of foreign governments and fishing fleets involved in the off s hore 
waters of New England. 
Most accounts of failing industries are concerned with economic overviews. 
However, the decline of the fishing fleet also means the dwindling from our 
society of a unique group of men and a culture whose importance outweighs 
in the end, the amount of fish they sell. 
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Bosselman, F. P. 1975. Property Rights in Land: New Statutory 
Approaches. Natural Res. J. 15(4):681-693. 
As rules controlling the use of land become more restrictive and 
complex, interest grows in transferring this function to the legislature. 
This paper explores some alternatives for statutory redefinition of 
property rights and analyses three different approaches to systems of 
providing compensation to landowners: the English system, American 
Law Institute proposals, and administrative compensation. 
Judicial attitudes are affected by general changes in public 
attitudes. Three areas of change have been important in recent years: 
1) a growing recognition that land is a resource of immense environ-
mental value, 2) a common popular assumption that urbanization inevitably 
leads to problems of air and water pollution, and 3) a growing belief 
that further development of the land is not in the homeowner's best 
interest due to increasing crime, tax and so forth. 
Land owner compensation in England has depended on statutes, with 
most claims negotiated and settlements reached that were reasonably 
satisfactory to both parties. The American Law Institute proposal.s 
suggest an alternative which does not involve a specific request for 
compensation by the landowner; instead the landowner asks the court . to 
declare the restrictive regulation invaiid, thus allowing him to build 
on his property. A third possible solution is a system of administrative 
compensation through \1'hich the issue could be taken out of the hands of 
the courts entirely. 
Bowles, F. P. 1973 . Natural Regulation of an Island lishing Community. 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 312 pp. 
The isolated fishing villages of the coast of Maine .::"t!present a unique 
adaptation to changing circumstances. The author c.onducted an ecological en-
quiry into the special adaptations of a maritime community on Neilson's Island, 
Maine, from September 1969 to September 1971. 
The behavior of the fishermen on Neilson's Island is constrained and re-
gulated by their adaptation to lobster fishing and by the environmental and 
biotic milieu in which they live. Natural regulation occurs when the numbers of 
fishermen on the island approach the limit imposed by harbor size. Knowledge 
of the upper bound on the number of fishermen and identification of the natural 
factors which regulate the numbers of fishermen within the bounds have direct 
bearing on the relationship of the numbers of fishermen to natural fluctuations 
in the lobster population. Lobster wars are described as an example of the 
instability which occurs when the homeostatic regulation of a biotic system 
is seriously disturbed and attempts to find a new equilibrium point. Despite 
increased specialization and sophistication of lobster fishing technology, 
the total number of fishermen has not increased , and the size of the territory 
used by the islanders has remained roughly the same. 
The understanding of the history and present adaptation of the fishermen 
on Neilson's Island can be clarified by the application of theorems concerning 
predator-prey interactions. 
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Campbell, B. A. 1973. License Limitation Regulations: Canada's Experience. 
J. Fish. Res. Board Canada 30(12) part 2-1: 2070-2076. 
Canada's experience on license limitation regulations is reviewed. In 
the late sixties Canada introduced legislation to provide for the limitation 
of fishing licenses in two specialized fisheries - the lobster fishery of the 
Atlantic, and the salmon fishery of the Pacific Coast. These regulations were 
introduced for economic reasons, not for conservation. 
In the salmon fishery, vessels with low production (B category) can re-
main in the salmon fishery for only 10 years. License fees for A category 
vessels have been increased sharply. New salmon vessels can be licensed only 
where an equal tonnage of A category vessels retires from the commercial 
fisheries. The government applies license money to a buy-back purpose. 
Indians have been given the special privilege of obtaining salmon licenses for 
their vessels at minimum cost, but they still cannot license a new vessel un-
less an equivalent tonnage of vessels has been retired. The average value of 
individual salmon vessels remaining in the fleet has increased substantially, 
and the higher values are not justified in relation to the increased return 
that can be achieved because of the fewer number of fishing vessels. 
In the Maritime Provinces the limitation program for lobster boats also 
has nbt progressed as quickly as the salmon program in British Columbia. 
Vessels have been divided into A and B categories, but no action had been 
taken up to September 1972 to limit the life of B category lobster vessels. 
Caves, R. D. and M. E. Porter 1977. From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: 
Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition. 
Quar. J. Econ. 91(2): 241-261. 
Concentrated sellers can erect barriers to new competition which per-
sistently distort efficient resource allocation, distortions which vary from 
industry to industry. This article argues three propositions: 1) both the 
newcomer and the established firm that acts to deter entry make investment 
decisions based on conjectures about uncertain future quasi-rents. The 
incumbent's actions affect both the entrant's conjectures about industry 
conditions following his entry and the "structural" barriers to entry. Thus, 
the entry barriers we observe are partly structural but at least partly en-
dogenous; 2) the theory of entry barriers has been limited unnecessarily by 
confining itself to the movement of firms from zero outputs to positive . It 
becomes much broader when set forth as a general theory of the mobility of 
firms among segments of an industry, thus encompassing exit and intergroups 
shifts as well as entry; and 3) in this broad framework of barriers-of-
mobility, diversification and the entry of established firms can be integrated to 
provide a basis for Bain' s "general condition of entry." 
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Christy , F. T. Jr. 1969. Fisheries Goals and the Rights of Property , 
Trans. Am. Fish. Soc. 98(2): 369-378. 
The author summarizes a session of the American Fisheries Society 
Annual Meeting in 1968. Satisfactory property rights in the fisheries 
are generally not available. In the absence of these rights, economic 
criteria have little meaning, and there is s ome justificat ion to the 
charge that economic efficiency is irrelevant. The confusion that ex ists 
between biologists and economists does not come from the non-relevance 
of economic goal, but rather from the assumptions that are implicit to 
the achievement of economic goals. These assumptions revolve around the 
concept of property rights. 
This paper attempts to clarify the meaning of property, distinguish-
ing between owner and user, between access to wealth and access to use, 
and between the degrees and kind of property rights; to examine the 
different goals of fisheries management with reference to the necessity 
and desirability of establishing property; and to evaluate the practical 
problems - the costs and difficulties - associated with the creation of 
property rights. 
Distinguishable rights in the fisheries include the rights to 
conserve, the right to access, and the right to extract rents. Five sets 
of goals are identified: increased catch, conservation, contributions to the 
economy, employment opportunities and the tradition of free fishing. The 
costs and difficulties of creating these rights, given the range of in-
terests and variety of goals, have not been assessed, nor have the non-
economic benefits been evaluated. 
Christy, F. T. Jr. 1972. Fisheries: Common Property, Open Access, 
and the Common Heritage. Resources for the Future, Inc., Reprint 
Number 101, 25 pp. 
The author examines several aspects of the concept of common 
property in the oceans, making a distinction between common property 
in terms of open access and common property in terms of the common 
heritage. 
Trends toward both appropriation and dissipation of wealth are 
already apparent. The severity of the problems associated with 
these trends and the severity of the difficulties of overcoming them 
are closely related to the distinction between the definitions of 
common property. 
Present interpretations of the law of the sea associate exclusive 
access with exclusive appropriation of wealth so that only those who 
exercise or acquire the right to fish can share in the distribution of 
wealth. This is supported by the customary and conventional law of 
the principle of the freedom of the seas. If the world community wishes 
to give meaning to the concept of common heritage in fisheries , free 
and open access must be closed and those who obtain the privilege of 
fishing must pay for this privilege. 
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Christy, F. T. Jr. 1975. Property Rights in the World Ocean. 
Natural Res. J. 15(4): 695-712. 
This article sketches the background and the problems associated 
with the transaction costs of acquiring and enforcing satisfactory 
property rights in the world ocean. 
The two factors involved in the move toward the establishment 
and enforcement of jurisdiction over ocean resour ces are the economic 
desirability of creating satisfactory property rights, and political 
pressures for redistribution of the wealth of the seas. It is clear 
that considerable economic waste results from the present common property 
conditions, but it is not clear whether the costs of acquiring and en-
forcing some form of satisfactory property rights are less than the 
benefits that can be achieved. This calculation is particularly diffi-
cult for many fishery resources, especially for those that swim freely 
across man's boundaries. Whether or not the calculations indicate that 
the acquisition and enforcement of jurisdiction is desirable, political 
pressures are such that attempts to acquire jurisdiction can be considered 
inexorable, .at least for resources of the coastal margin. 
Christy, F. T. Jr. 1977. Limited Access Systems Under the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976. In L. G. Anderson, editor F~onomic Impacts 
of F~tended Fisheries Jurisdiction, Chapter 7, pp. 141-156, Ann Arbor, 
Ann Arbor Science rublishers. 
The author looks at the negative aspects of the Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-265). 
Several provisions in this act significantly affect the adoption of limited 
access system by the fisheries and, in consequence, insures the long-run health 
of the industry. These concern: 1) the adoption of a limited access system; 2) 
collection of fees; 3) the capacity criterion with regard to the allocation 
of shares between domestic and foreign fishermen; and 4) the collection of fees 
from foreigners. The act is detrimental to the interest of society because no 
return is received from the use of publicly owned resources, it harms the tax-
payer because the costs of research, development, enhancement, regulation and 
enforcement will be borne by him rather than by the beneficiaries - the fisher-
men. Untimately these factors will force the Office of Management and Budget 
to limit funds for fisheries research and management, and the fishing industry 
will suffer as well. The consumer must pay higher prices for fish produced 
by domestic fishermen because of the exclusion of foreigners who provided low-
priced imports. Although we are given the opportunity to receive some revenues 
from foreigners, revenues are limited and will decline as foreigners are phased 
out. Under this act, the effectiveness of limited access is severely limited. 
The prohibition against fees and taxes will severely hamper effective manage-
ment of fisheries , and no one will gain, neither the fishermen nor society. 
Christy, F. T. Jr. and A. Scott 1965. The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries: 
Some Problems of Growth and Economic Allocation. Johns Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, Maryland, 280 pp. 
This study of some of the economic and political difficulties that impede 
the rational development of international fisheries is a background study on 
the economic characteristics of the fishery industries and on the legal and 
institutional framework within which the industries operate. 
The concept of the fishery as a common property natural resource is 
fundamental to an understanding of economic inefficiency in the industry. 
The worldwide demand for fish is growing very rapidly, but the growth of 
demand is not uniform, either as to nation or as to the species of fish. 
The consumer discriminates between species of fish and between kinds of 
processing, so the fishermen of the world must still compete for the 
relatively few species for which there is a known market and clear demand • . 
However, the desired fish are not distributed uniformly throughout the 
oceans. In general, the coastal waters and continental shelves yield the 
greatest quantities of fish currently in demand, but even in these areas 
there are wide differences; thus fishermen tend to concentrate in areas of 
known productivity. 
The result is conflicts of increased competition for scarce resources, 
and of the extension of effort by foreign fishermen into areas that have 
historically been fished only by the vessels of the adjacent staie. · Perhaps 
the most immediate area of conflict lies in the definition of the extent of 
exclusive fishing rights. Even on the high seas, where it is clear that all 
nations have equal legal rights, problems arise because of congestion of 
vessels or because of conflicting methods of catching. The resolution of 
such conflicts over fisheries resources is difficult. It is suggested that 
economic objectives should play a stronger role in the decisions on inter-
national arrangements than in the past. The author suggests an international 
fishery authority that could make use of the lowest cost labor and vessels 
and sell its product to the highest bidder. 
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Cicin-Sain, B. 1978. Evaluative Criteria in Making Limited Entry Decisions: 
An Overview. Paper prepared for the National Conference to Consider 
Limited Entry as a Tool in Fishery Management, Denver, Colorado, 
July 17-19. 
Among the major methods of fisheries management , limited entry has re-
ceived most attention and stirred up the greatest controversy. Possibly 
limited entry represents an effort to restrict freedom of entry into an occu-
pation noted for its tradition of independence. 
The author abstracts the major considerations in evaluating alternative 
management arrangements, including biological effectiveness, social equity , 
economic efficiency, legal feasibility, political feasibility, and administra-
~ive feasibility, and proposes an application of this framework to the specific 
management technique of limited entry. 
The extent to which limited entry addresses questions of biological 
effectiveness is unclear, for, in most cases, limited entry needs to be com-
plemented by other management measures. Considering social equity, a number 
of difficult questions such as equitable license allocation, compensation, 
and long-range effects as well as short-range effects must be resolved. With 
regard to economic efficiency , the hypothesized benefits from limited entry 
need to be tested against empirical reality. Alternative methods of manage-
ment must also be judged according to their legal, political and administrative 
feasibilities. No solution is universally applicable. Each fishery demands 
a different set of calculations and calls for different management solutions. 
Ciracy-Wantrup, S. V. and R. C. Bishop 1975. Common Property as a Concept 
in Natural Resources Policy. Natur~l Res. J. 15(4): 714-727. 
The authors argue that the term "common property" as used by 
modern day economists when referring to the so-called "theory of common 
property resources" or "tragedy of the commons", often distorts the basic 
meaning of the concept in such a way as to discredit it as a valuable tool 
in the economic analysis and solution of problems of natural resources policy. 
The term "common property" refers here to a distribution of property 
rights in resources in which a number of owners are co-equal in their rights 
of usage. Their rights are not lost through non-use, but co-equal owners 
are not necessarily equal with respect to the quantities of the resource 
each uses over a period of time. This meaning of the concept of common 
property is well established in formal institutions such as the Anglo-Saxon 
common law, the German land law, the Roman law and their successors. Common 
property is not everybody's property; potential resource users who are not 
members of a group of co-equal owners are excluded. In any event, economists 
are not free to use the concept under conditions where no institutional 
arrangements exist. 
This paper defines institutional level as a three-level hierarchy of 
decision systems: operating level, institutional level and policy level. 
The commons in economic history are also reviewed, and common property, 
public trust and public property as solutions for natural resource management 
problems are examined. 
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Crutchfield, J. A., editor 1965. The Fisheries: Prnb]ems in Resourc e Ma na ge-
ment. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1965, 136 pp. 
This seri£s of papers and commentary on public policy issues involved 
in the management of fisheries resources were prepared by members of the 
faculty of the University of Washington for the inaugural series of Natural 
Resources Public Policy Seminars, sponsored by the Graduate School of Public 
Affairs , held in 1963. 
Included are: Concepts and Practices in the Conservation of Fishery Re-
sources, by William F. Royse; Methods of Fishery Regulation, by Donald E. 
Bevan; Economic Objectives of Fishery Management, by J. A. Crutchfield; Evalua-
tion of the Fishing Industry and Fish Preservation Facilities: The Columbia 
River Case, by Marion E. Marts; Principle of Abstention: The Case of the United 
States Halibut Fishery, by Richard Van Cleve; Constitutionality of Limiting the 
Number of Fishermen in a Commercial Fishery, by Robert L. Fletcher; and High 
Sea s Fisheries and the Law: A Case Study in the North Pacific, by Ralph W. 
Johnson. 
Crutchfield, J. A. and G. Pontecorvo 1969. The Pacific Salmon Fisherie s: A 
Study of International Conservation, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
220 pp. 
The consequences of open access and irrational conservation are described , 
and the authors develop a model that can be used in other case studies and a 
framework for control of access and for the establishment of effective conserva-
tion rules and efficient economic measures. 
Despite millions of dollars invested in research, propagation , and regulatory 
activity, the Pacific Coast salmon resources are, at best, stabilized ; i n some 
areas sa lmon is clearly subject to continuing depletion due to irrationa l conser-
vation measures, with little scientific knowledge, power plays by competing 
fishing and processing groups, research and regulatory emphasis on reductions 
in efficiency , and from unrestricted access. 
The generalized model suggests that the industry will always be balanced 
precariously with respect to interindustry and international competition 
under the open access situation . There are no simple remedies , and variations 
in the geographic, technica~ legal, and sociological elements underly ing the 
structure of different fisheries call for the careful construction of efficiency-
oriented management programs adopted to each separate case. Once the industry 
has adjusted to depletion and/or to regulations framed in terms of physical 
objectives, only second best solutions are possible, at least in the short 
run. 
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Dales, J. H. 1972. Land, Water, and Ownership. In R. Dorfman and N. 
S. Dorfman,editors, Economics of the Environment. W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., New York, pp. 171-186. 
This proposal to the common property market in pollution rights is 
based on one-way cotnmunication. The government-owner's decisions about 
the use of water would be transmitted to the users of the asset, with 
no feedback from the users to the owner. A rise in the price of a 
pollution right would be the signal that the waste disposal use of 
water is becoming more valuable; but this does not mean that the supply 
of allowable waste disposal capacity should be increased, for the value 
of the competing amenity use of water is likely to increase under the 
impact of the same growth forces that make the waste disposal use more 
valuable. 
Four important elements in this scheme are: the mapping of water 
regions; the setting of waste equivalents; the choice of the allowable 
amount of waste discharge; and the choice of a time interval during 
which the number of pollution rights is fixed. 
Pollution charges should be higher in areas where pollution is 
currently at low levels than in areas where it is at high levels, for 
the system of low pollution charges for a low pollution level tends 
to spread pollution evenly over the countryside. 
Dam, K. W. 1974. The E'.rolution of North Sea Licensing Policy in Britain and 
Norway. J. Law Econ. 17(2): 213-263. 
Great Britain is expected to become self-sufficient in oil production 
by 1980 due to recent discoveries of large quantities of oil in the British 
sector of the North Sea. Since there is no requirement in Britain that oil , 
unlike gas, be sold to a monopoly buyer, the oil will be sold at a market 
price. Hence, the law provides no means for capturing any economic rent 
for resources discovered under existing licenses. As the magnitude of the 
total oil reserves in the North Sea has become apparent, public uneasiness 
about the size of future oil company profits and the inadequacy of the 
existing system has grown. The newly elected Labour Government's White Paper 
(1974) called for "Government participation" and reform of the corporation 
tax system. 
This article describes the evolution of the economic dimensions of 
licensing policy. Governments operate in a political environment and face 
two basic requirements: 1) the system must attract private capital and 
technical capability, and 2) the system cannot be seen by the voters as a 
giveaway to private companies of the nation's resources. Only when these 
two basic requirements are satisfied can the government's licensing policy 
expect to achieve allocative efficiency and actually capture the economic 
rent. The decision faced by governments has been whether to use the auction 
system or a discretionary system, and the latter alternative having been chosen , 
how to deal with the resulting transfer of wealth to private hands . In Britain 
it was the desire to favor local enterprise, to force the rate of exploration , 
and to keep maximum flexibility and control in the government's hands that 
led to the discretionary system. 
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Dennen, R. T. 1976. Cattlemen's Associations and Property Rights in 
Land in the American West. Expl. Econ. Hist. 13: 423-436. 
A clearly defined arrangement of property rights evolved in the 
use of American rang e land. The rise of the range cattle industry in 
the United States began in the late 1860's, with exclusive tenure to 
land on the Great Plains gained in several ways: 1) purchase at 
government auctions with minimum price of $1.25 per acre; 2) a pre-
emption claim of 160 acres for a fee of $1.25 per acre; and 3) a 
homestead claim to receive 160 acres at no cost by fulfilling certain 
require~ents. However, 160 acres of free land could support only 5 to 
15 head of cattle per year, and land at $1.25 per acre was generally 
priced too high to make purchase feasible. It was economically im-
possible for cattleman to acquire large areas of range land; thus common 
property use of unowned land developed. The overuse of common property 
land, became a major concern of cattlemen, and they organized in 
Cattlemen's Associations to prevent it. Two vital functions were re-
cognized: the establishment of a method for agreeing on who should be 
admitted to a range, and the prevention of entry by newcomers. The 
important rights developed were "range rights" and "water rights". 
Established cattleillent refused to cooperate with new entrants, and such 
a refusal effectively blocked entry. The intensity of use was controlled 
by the practice of stocking the range in proportion to holdings of water 
rights by members of the association. This rule was enforced by the 
threat of expulsion from the joint roundup. The increased income avail-
able to any individual was determined by allocation of property rights 
within the group. Exchange of range rights was a common occurrence. 
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Dorfman, R. and N. S. Dorfman,editors 1972. F.cono"lics of the Environment: 
Selected Readings. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 426 pp. 
The essays in this collection are concerned with the economic aspects of 
curn~nt environmental problems. The collection consists of twenty-six 
paper s divided into five groups: 1) An overview; 2) formal analysis; 
3) policies for environmental protection; 4) the roots of environmental 
degradation; and 5) measuring costs and benefits. 
In the first group are: The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, by 
Larry E. Ruff; Analysis of Environmental Pollution, by Allen V. Kneese; and 
International Environmental Problems - A Taxonomy, by Clifford S. Russell 
and Hans H. Landsberg. 
The second group: Externalities, Information, and Alternative Col-
lective Action, by Otto A. Davis and Morton I. Kamien; The Economic Theory 
of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, by H. Scott Gordon; The Problem 
of Social Cost, by Ronald Coase; On Divergences between Social Cost and Private 
Cost, by Ralph Turvey; and Causing Offsite Costs to be Reflected in Waste 
Disposal Decisions, by Allen V. Kneese and Blair T. Bower. 
The third group: Standards, Charges, and Equity, by Allen V. Kneese 
and Blair T. Bower; Land, Water, and Ownership, by J. H. Dales; Property 
Rights and Amenity Rights, by E. J. Mishan; Transaction Costs, Resource 
Allocation, and Liability Rules, by Guido Calabresi; The Role of Government: 
Neighborhood Effect, by Mil ton Friedman; A Public-Decision Model Applied to 
Local Pollution Problems, by Robert Dorfman and Henry D. Jacoby; and The 
Animal Farm: A Mathematical Model for the Discussion of Social Standards 
for Control of the Environment, by Harold A. Thomas, Jr. 
In the fourth group: The Environmental costs of Economic Growth, by 
Barry Commoner; The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crises, by Lewis 
W. Moncriff; The Convergence of Environmental Disruption, by Marshall I. 
Goldman; The Property Interface, by J. H. Dales; Growthmania, by E. J. 
Mishan on Progress, by Roger W. Weiss; and The Further Dimensions, by 
John Kenneth Galbraith. 
The final gro~p: The Valuation of Public Goods, by Paul Davidson; Air 
Pollution and Human Health, by Lester B. Lave and Eugene P. Seskin; Com-
parisons of Methods for Recreation Evaluation, by Jack L. Knetsch and 
Robert K. Davis; and Environmental Repercussions and the Economic Structure: 
An Input-Output Approach, by Wassily Leontief. 
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Fraser, G. A. 1977. License Limitation in the British Columbia Salmon 
Fishery. Environment Canada, Economics and Special Industry Service 
Directorate Pacific Region Technical Report Series No. PAC/T-77-13. 
74 pp. 
This study offers a useful summary of the British Columbia experience 
on license limitation. The author focuses on the historical and theoretical 
background, the implementation of license limitation and the effectiveness 
of the program. 
Earlier limited licensing plans applied in British Columbia suffered 
from a single major defect: they were viewed primarily as a means for re-
source conservation , a nd their full consequences were disregarded. 
Limitation created an economic rent from the resource; this rent 
inevitably accrued to those canneries and individuals who obtained t he right 
of resource exploitation. This created a general demand from those excluded 
to enter the industry. These pressures inevitably led to the demise of the 
licensing programme. 
The forces that operate now are better understood. Nevertheless, it 
appears that little has been learned; the major problems with the current 
programme seem to bear an uncanny resemblance to those of the past. 
Gertenbach, L. P. D. 1973. License Limitation Regulations: The South African 
System. J. Fish. Res . Board Canada 30: 2077-2084. 
The South African system of license limitation regulations began in 
1949 when the government refused to issue licenses for additional fish-
processing factories and to limit the number and capacity to those already 
in operation or und er construction. The present regulations are based 
on regulations enacted in 1953. A Pilchard/Marasbanker Boat Limitation 
Committee of government, factory, and fishermen representatives was 
established to apply controls over the number of boats, their hold capacity 
and the allocation of this fleet to the various factories. Adjustments were 
made from time to time to cope with changing conditions in the resource. How-
ever, this control system was weakened when fishing and'processing licenses 
were granted to operators of fishmeal factory ships. The limitation of entry 
into fishing and processing has resulted in a smaller number of boats, larger-
size boats with more powerful engines and equipment, and increased factory-
ownership of boats. Through the policy of restricting entry at the early 
stages of the new industry, it acquired sufficient resilience to cope with 
both ups and downs. However , it appears doubtful that overcrowded fishing 
and processing sectors would have had sufficient resilience to face fluctuating 
catches and fishmeal prices. 
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Gordon, H. S. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: 
The Fishery. J. Pol. Econ. 62(2): 124-142. 
In this modern examination of the economic theory of a common-
property resource such as the fisheries, the author demonstrates that 
an "overfishing problem" has its roots in the economic organization 
of the industry. 
All control measures have, in the past, been designed by biologists, 
who paid attention solely to the production aspects of the problem, and 
not to the cost side. The result has been a persistent problem of over-
fishing. 
The author uses a static analysis of the production function of the 
fishing industry to show that optimum economic fishing intensity occurs 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue and is less than that which 
results in a pattern of competition among fishermen which culminates in 
the dissipation of the rent of the intramarginal grounds; and that it is 
possible that some grounds could be exploited at a level of negative 
marginal productivity. 
The great immobility of fishermen and their hope of a lucky catch 
prevent an equilibration of their incomes with that of other members of 
society. In a few places fishermen have banded together into a local 
monopoly, preventing entry and controlling their own operations. By 
this means the amount of fishing gear has been greatly reduced and in-
comes considerably improved. 
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Gulland, J. A. 1974. rhe Management of Marine Fisheries. University of 
Washington Press, Seattle, 198 pp. 
This survey of fisheries management cites cases such as Antarctic whaling 
and North Atlantic trawl fisheries, reviews the biological basis, objectives, 
techniques and mechanics of fisheries management; and discusses the manage-
ment of fisheries in the future. 
Any account of the management of marine fisheries must discuss the 
history of Antarctic whaling as the foremost example of failure to manage 
and conserve a resource, and current progress in the national management of 
the whale stocks. The efficiency has been the immediate cause of most of 
the problems of fisheries management in the world today. Mesh size regulations 
and control of the amount of fishing are discussed. 
All management of fisheries depends on biological information to predict 
population dynamics. The logistic model and dynamic pool model and their 
development are reviewed. Many management schemes are weighted in favor of 
the existing fishermen and their individual interests. In addition to 
ordinary techniques of management such as mesh or fish size limits, closed 
seasons or areas, gear limitation, the improvement of living resources, and 
the regulation of total catch by species, the direct control of the total 
amount of fishing svch as limited entry, and the allocation of shares in 
any catch quota between countries are discussed. In response to the increasing 
popularity of multi-national fisheries, some new formal arrangements are 
necessary. Although many international bodies are concerned with fisheries 
management, enforcement is a problem. The need for rules to be kept-and to 
be seen to be kept- is especially important in international fisheries. 
Haefele, E. T., editor 1974. The Governance of Common Property Resources. 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 181 pp. 
This volume contains papers presented at a forum conducted by Resources 
for the Future, Inc., in Washington, D.C., January 21-22, 1974. These are: 
The Technical Basis for Decision Making, by Robert Dorfmani; Managing the 
Public Lands: Assignment of Property Rights and Valuation of Resources, 
by Anthony C. Fisher and John V. Krutilla; Environmental Quality, Household 
Migration, and Collective Choice, by Paul Portney,John Sanstelie and Allen 
Kneese; Industry Influence on Environmental Decision Making, by Mark 
Sharefkin and Talbot Page; The Continuing Role of the Courts in Allocating 
Common Property Resources , by Victor G. Rosenblum; and How Does the Agenda 
Get Set? by J. Clarence Davies, 3d. In addition, some comments are given 
by Clifford S. Russell, Marion Clawson, John Hansen and Irving K. Fox. 
28 
Hamlisch, R., editor 1962. Economic Effects of Fishery Regulation. 
FAO Fisheries Report No. 5, 561 pp. 
This includes working papers and a record of discussions at FAO 
expert meeting in Ottawa 12-17 June 1961. The panel issues: 1) The 
Economics of Regulating Fisheries, by A. Scott, 2) Effects of Fishery 
Regulations on the Catch of Fish, by L. M. Dickie, 3) The Economic 
Effects of the Regulation of the Trawl Fisheries of Japan , by N. Oka , 
4) Regulation in the North American Lobster Fishery, by G. Pontecorvo, 
5) License Limitation-British Columbia, by S. Sinclair, 6) Regulation 
of the Pacific Coast Halibut Fishery, by J. A. Crutchfield, and 7) 
Regulation of the South African West Coast Shoal Fisheries, by L. P. D. 
Gertenbach. 
Five papers relating to the subject of the meeting, which were 
not discussed in Ottawa, were also included: 1) On Some Aspects of 
Fishery Conservation Problems, by A. Zellner, 2) Application of 
Mathematical Programming Techniques to Commercial Fishery Conservation 
Problems, by A. Zellner, 3) The Case for Regulations of the Shrimp 
Fishery of Panama, by L. K. Boerema and J. L. Obarrio, 4) Effects of 
Fishery Regulation on The Processing and Marketing of Fishery Product s , 
by W. H. Stolting, and 5) Great Lakes Commercial Fishing Regulations, 
by K. D. Brouillard. 
Harding, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243-1248. 
This article illustrates the mechanism of a common property re-
source under open access by the example of cattle pastured on a commons. 
As long as the numbers of man and beast are well below the carrying 
capacity of the land, such an arrangement may be satisfactory. However, 
when social stability becomes a reality, each herdman seeks to maximize 
his gain. Since each herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale 
of an additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. Since , 
however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the 
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is on a 
fraction of - 1. Each rational herdsman adds more animal to his herd, 
so each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit in a world that is limited. The freedom of the 
commons brings ruin to all. 
.. 
Juergensmeyer, 
Concept: 
Problem. 
29 
J. C. and J. B. Wadley 1974. The Common Lands 
A "Commons" Solution to a Common Environmental 
Natural Res. J. 14(3): 361-381. 
This history of the common lands concept begins in pre-Norman 
England, proceeds through English legal history to the American 
colonies , and ends in modern American jurisprudence as it deals 
with myriad problems of environment and ecology. The common lands 
concept is a manifestation of the communal ownership principle. Al-
though the idea of community is a very real part of American property 
ownership and we are gradually recognizing the social nature of pro-
perty, we in fa~t remain very compartmentalized. The common lands 
concept has become relevant to contemporary American jurisprudence 
as a reflection of society's need and ability to recognize more communal 
ownership and less private ownership, as in the environmental crisis. 
Although the common lands concept was developed to protect individuals 
in their enjoyment of private land use rights, the concept provides 
the framework and analytical methology needed to protect individuals 
in their enjoyment of public land use rights. 
Junankar, P. N. 1976. Land Tenure and Indian Agricultural Productivity. 
J. Develop. Studies Oct. 13(1): 42-60. 
Land tenure is directly related to agricultural production in 
this econometric study of production in the Ferozepur district of 
Punjab using Farm Management Studies data for 1968/69 and 1969/70 . 
Differences between small and large farms and the relative inefficiency 
of tenants relative to owners were tested. 
Although results on the size issue are ambiguous, the study shows 
that a farmer decreases in efficiency as he leases more land, and ten-
ants are less productive than owner farmers. These results imply that 
land reforms such as a land lease ceiling andjor "land to the tiller" 
are desirable as long-term solutions for Indian agriculture because 
a land lease ceiling and/or "land to the tiller" reforms would in-
crease production as well as lead to a break-up of the landowning 
monopoly. 
30 
Kalish, L., J. Hartzog, and H. Cassidy 1978. The Threat of Entry with 
Mutually Aware Potential Entrants: Comment. J. Pol. Econ. 86(1): 
147-150. 
The theory of potential competition in taking account of potential 
entrants who are mutually aware of each other was broadened by Sherman and 
Willett (1967) and Goldberg and Moirao (1973). The former demonstrated that 
the likelihood of a specific firm entering an industry might decrease if the 
number of potential entrants increased from one to two. Based on this result, 
they concluded that the entry-forestalling price determined by the industries 
current competitors would either remain the same or rise. The latter accepted 
Sherman and Willett's result, but added that the limit price is more affected 
by the overall probability of there being one or more actual entrants, which 
they demonstrated must increase as the number of potential entrants increases. 
Thus, Goldberg and Moirao concluded that, if anything, the limit price will 
decline as the number of potential entrants increases. 
This comment points out an error in Goldberg and Moirao and quantita-
tively demonstrates that when the number of potential entrants increases 
from one to two, the overall probability of one or more entrants may rise, 
fall, or remain constant. 
Keen, Elmer A. 1978. Fishery Rights and the 200-Mile Zone: The Tragedy 
of a Mal-stinted Commons. Unpublished manuscript, Center for Marine 
Studies, San Diego State University. 
The author assesses the present limited entry schemes negatively, 
explores more effective fisheries resource management schemes from the 
points of view of management and harvest functions and investment oppor-
tunity, and proposes a single owner type management system under national 
control. 
Limited entry could serve to reduce excessive investment in the means of 
exploitation and create rent in the fisheries, but would not end dependence 
on measures designed to counter the tragedy of the commons by making fishing 
less efficient. Also, it would in no way encourage economic rent generated 
to be channeled into investment that would improve the resource. The long 
run effect would be to make management more difficult. The productivity of 
fishery resources, especially of the more valuable species, is certain to 
increase as the incentives for national investment created by the FCMA 
become effective. This increased production in turn will create a need to 
change effort within and between fisheries. Valuable property rights create 
conservation on the part of the holders, and inflexibilities will be created 
for resource managers. 
31 
Knight, H. G. and J. P. Lambert 1975. Legal Aspects of Limited Entry for 
Commercia l Marine Fisheries. Louisiana State University , 119 pp. 
This is a comprehensive study of the legal aspects of limited entry 
for commercial marine fisheries. The needs of each individual fishery are 
so diverse, and the economics of each fishing industry so varied , that no 
generalization would be helpful. This report provides a "checkl ist" of 
legal points which should be considered by resource managers and their 
lawyers when drafting a limited entry system. This list of issues , if 
properly addressed, should result in the preparation of a law which would 
survive any legal challenges. 
Koch, C. L. 1978. A Federal Constitutional Analysis of Limited Entry System. 
Paper presented at the Workshop on Limited Entry into Fisheries , Institute 
for Marine Studies, University of Washington. 
The paper presents an analysis of six constitutional issues that have 
been raised with regard to limited entry systems. These include: the Delegation 
Doctrine; Substantive Due Process; Procedural Due Process ; Equal Protection; the 
"Taking" Issue; and Transferability of Permits. 
There are no constitutional infirmities hindering the development of a 
limited entry program under the FCMA. The most significant administrative 
obstacle would be the hearings which may be required for fishermen denied access. 
The lesson to other constitutional objectives can be avoided by designing a 
limited entry system in which each ingredient of the plan bears a rational re-
lationship to the objective sought through limited entry. Permits could con-
stitutionally be made nontransferable. The major problem facing implementation 
of limited entry system would be administrative, not constitutional . 
Krutilla, J. V. and A. C. Fisher 1975. The Economics of Natural Environments. 
Studies in the Valuation of Commodity and Amenity Resources. Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, Maryland , 292 pp. 
The economic evaluation of parks and wilderness areas, known as amenity 
r esources, has been long neglected by traditional cost-benefit analysis. The 
r esult has been that land management personnel , faced with allocation d ec isions 
involving incompatible uses, have often opted for the tangible benefits of 
extractive development , taking little account of the economic losses incurred 
in the destruction of irreplaceable natural areas . 
In this pioneering study, the authors put the amenity resources of natural 
environments into an analytical framework comparable to that for the extractive 
resources . The models and theoretical background of their techniques are illus-
trated by case studies which include the controversial Hells Canyon Dam, the 
Mineral King Ski Re s OJ t, and the Trans-Alaska pipeline. 
The authors point out that resourc e development activities undertaken on 
public l ands often receive financial advantages - preferential tax treatment, 
subsidized capital, and access to public resources - that are not taken into 
account in the costs of the project. True evaluation of the costs and benefits 
of a development project often tips the balance in favor of preserving an area 
in a natural state. 
Leistritz, F. L. and S. W. Voelker 1975. 
Problems, and Suggested Solutions. 
32 
Coal Resource a~~ership: Pattern~ 
Natural Res. J. 15: 643-662. 
This article traces the historical development of coal ownership patterns 
ln the United States and describes problems stemming from the separation of 
mineral rights from surface rights and the fractionalization of separated 
mineral rights. The authors examine the procedures used in West Germany and 
the United Kingdom to handle coal development problems under systems of 
separated mineral ownership. Finally, possible changes in contractual, in-
stitutional and legal arrangements to alleviate U.S. coal ownership problems 
are discussed. 
The pattern of coal resource ownership differs greatly among the various 
coal areas. The most complex situations occur in the Northern Great Plains 
and the Rocky Mountains, where public and private ownership are intermingled, 
and mineral ownership is separated from surface ownership on more than half 
of the land. The continued expansion of strip mining in these two areas 
provokes numerous land use problems resulting from present ownership patterns. 
Possible measures to resolve surface - subsurface conflicts include 1) 
acquisition of all coal resource ownerships by a single government unit; 2) 
an official arbitration system; 3) improvement of contractual relations 
between mining companies and surface owners by voluntary action; 4) pooling of 
royalty payments in each mine or locality; 5) establishment of trusts by 
district courts to subjection of all privately-owned mineral rights to 
property taxation. 
33 
Marcelli, R. J. and R. D. Matthew:, editors 1975. To Stem the Tide: Effective 
State Marine Fisheries Management. The Council of State Governments, 
Lexington, Kentucky, 88 pp. 
In July 1974, the Council of State Governments established a national 
task force on effective state marine fisheries management programs to develop 
suggested state legislation in this area. This publication contains an over-
view of the legislation, task-force recommendations, the Marine Fisheries 
Management Act and excerpts from the National Conference on Effective Manage-
ment of Marine Fisheries held at Hyannis, Massachusetts, on June 24-25, 1975. 
The excerpts includes: Role of the States in Fisheries Management, 
by Tom McCall; The State-Federal Fisheries Management Program, by Richard 
H. Schaefer; Limited Entry-Alaska Experience, by Roy Rickey; Statistics: 
Who Counts What and Why, by John P. Harville; Recreational Fishing Interests -
Conflicts and Cooperation, by Frank E. Carlton; and Management of Marine 
Fisheries Resources, by David H. Wallace. 
McConnell, K. E. and V. J. Norton 1978. An Evaluation of Limited Entry and 
Alternative Approaches to Fishery Management. Paper prepared for the 
National Conference to Consider Limited Entry as a Tool in Fisheries 
Management, Denver, Colorado, July 17-19. 
Alternative fisheries management regulatory techniques must consider 
the following issues for economic efficiency: a) freedom of participants; 
b) transactions costs; c) technological advances; and d) waste from discards. 
Any management scheme which excludes limited entry tends to fall short of 
these criteria. 
As a consequence, the authors propose a limited entry-price adjustment 
scheme which consider: 1) a moratorium on entry by ecosystem; 2) a price 
adjustment system which effectively reduces the ex-vessel price of over fished 
species; 3) a vessel buy-back program, designed to maintain or reduce the 
quantity of effort; 4) marine licenses and permits for recreational fishing; 
and 5) management of the fishery in a way that corresponds as closely as 
possible to the free enterprise economy. 


36 
Mundt, J. C. 1978. Legal aspects: Washington. Paper presented at the 
National Conference to Consider Limited Entry as a Tool in Fisheries 
Management, Denver, Colorado, July 17-19. 
This memorandum contains an analysis of the issues which might arise 
in a lawsuit challenging the T.imited Entrv Act or the Salmon License 
Moratorium Extension Act as those bills have been developed in the State 
of Washington. 
The two legislative purposes of each of the proposed acts are 1) 
improvement of the management of the salmon fishery and 2) improvement of the 
economic health of the salmon fishing industry. 
The analysis comments on the validity of these legislative purposes; a 
substantive due process theory; the equal protection clause of the U.S. 
Constitution; the impact of the acts on interstate commerce; the privileges 
and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution; the terms of the Interstate 
Compac t between Oregon and Washington with respect to the management of 
fisheries on the Columbia River; the impact which the Pacific Marine 
Fisheries Compact between California , Washington and Oregon and the resulting 
Washington state legislation may have on the enactment and implementation of 
the two acts; the impact of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries 
Convention and the implementing federal legislation; the effects of the 
Boldt and Belloni decisions on the prospective Washington laws; the future 
impact of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976; and other 
issues such as securities laws, anti-trust laws and compensation for private 
property. 
Newton , C. H. B. 1978. Experience with Limited Entry in Fisheries: British 
Columbia. Paper presented at the National Conference to Consider 
Limited Entry as a Tool in Fisheries Management, Denver , Colorado, 
July 17-19. 
The ten years' of ex perience with limited entry in British Columbia 
are reviewed with respect to major criticisms of the program. The author 
presents arguments against the five major criticisms and notes that the future 
of the program requires clear government action with respect to the future 
of the common property aspect of the resource . 
These criticisms are summarized as 1) limited entry has not pr evented 
overcapitalizat i on; 2) the ownership of the resource has been transferred 
to an elite; 3) t he status quo between gear types is irrevocably changed; 
4) management of the resource has not been facilitated; and 5) limited entry 
has not provided a solution to long-term control of fishing effort . These 
criticisms may stem from misconceptions about the objectives of the program: 
1) incr eased incomes to f ishermen up to the average regional wage; 2) reduced 
leve l of overcapacity by r educing the size of the fleet , and 3) reduced 
number of vessels to improve the management of the resource. The operational 
guideline is to identify the salmon fleet through the grandfathering system 
and then to apply tools to reduce the fleet. It is not possible to judge 
the adequacy of limited entry programs in a short time. 
37 
Olsen, Fred L. 1974. Fisheries Management with Landings Fees and Subsidies. 
Presented at the Northeast Fish and Wildlife Conferences Northeast 
Division, American Fisheries Society, February 27. 
The author proposes a landing equalization fee and a subsidy scheme as 
a fisheries management tool. This plan would place a landing equalization 
fee on a valuable overfished species distribute and the accumulated funds 
back to the fishing fleet in proportion to their landings of other species 
that are of lower value and abundance. This type of scheme would make 
fishermen indifferent as to which resource they harvest because the net 
income from the overfished resource minus the landings fee would be the 
same as the net income from the abundant resource plus the subsidy provided 
by the landing fees. 
Orbach, M. K. 1978. Social and cultural aspects of limited entry. Paper 
presented at the Workshop and Conference on Limitation of Entry into 
Fisheries Institute for Marine Studies, University of Washington, 
May and July. 
The social and cultural aspects and effects of limiting access to 
fisheries resources are interwoven with others such as the economic and the 
political. The national standards set out in the FCMA suggest some limita -
tions on the use of social and economic considerations. 
Limited entry is described as a method of protecting individuals' 
economic, social, and psychological well-being from the effects of their 
own actions, or from the actions of others. It is an exercise in social 
responsibility. The social, cultural, and economic effects of limited entry 
systems are relative, meaningful only against the backdrop of the objectives 
of the program. If the primary objectives are biological, limited entry 
may not be necessary; if the objectives are other than biological, there 
must be a definition of who will be "in", who will be "out", and with what 
consequences. 


Rickey, R. 1975. Limited Entry 
and R. 0. Matthews, editors, 
F-1 sher 1cs Management, 59-61 
40 
- The Alaska Experience. In R. J. Marcelli 
To Stem the Tide : Effective State Marine 
pp., Lexington: Council of State Government. 
The mairi impetus behind the enactment of the Alaskan limited entry 
legislation in 1973 was the dilemma confronting the salmon fisheries in 
the state. The primary problem was a radical increase in the amount of 
gear being used to fish a salmon resource resulting in decline of catches. 
Secondly, it was strongly believed that if the state did not take some 
form of affirmative action, the federal government would intervene. 
Two areas make this act unique. First, the commission sets the 
fees for the permits, which reflect the cost of administering this program. 
Secondly, the general taxpayer does not pay for this program. The fisher -
men who are involved in the program are the sour-ce of funding, and t-hey 
pay an entry permit fee in addition to the licensing fee. 
The act applies to only 19 fisheries. The mechanism that is used in 
the reduction plan is a voluntary buy-back system. The state developed a 
point system to determine eligible fishermen. Under this program the entry 
permits are considered personal property. The Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission was established as a distinct entity at the outset in order to 
avoid disruption. 
Roedel, P. M., editor, 1975. Optimum Sustainable Yield as a Concept in 
Fisheries Management. American Fisheries Society Special Publication 
No. 9, Washington, DC, 89 pp. 
This volume of the proceedings of a symposium held during the 104th 
annual meeting of the American Fisheries Society, Honolulu, Hawaii, September 
9, 1974 includes: Use of Yield Models in Fishery Management, by William F. 
Royce; An Economic View of Optimum Sustainable Yield, by James A Crutchfield; 
Application of Optimum Sustainable Yield Theory to Marine Fisheries, By John 
Radovich; Optimum Sustainable Yield in Inland Recreational Fisheries Management, 
by Richard 0. Anderson; Optimum Sustainable Yield-Commercial Fisheries Views, 
by Robert G. Mauermann; Optimum Sustainable Yield as a Management Concept in 
Recreational Fisheries, by Frank E. Carlton; Multidisciplinary Aspects of 
Optimum Sustainable Yield, by John P. Harville; Views of a State Fisheries 
Administrator, by Thomas L. Linton; Views of an Economist in the Academic 
World, by Savatore Comitini; Views of a Recreational Fisherman, by FrankL. 
Cassidy, Jr.; and Usefulness of the Optimum Yield Concept, by RichardS. Croker. 
In addition, a summary and critique of the symposium is given by Philip M. 
Roedel. 
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